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EU competition law and the digital economy – FIDE 2020 Topic 3 General Report 
Update 
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel1 
This brief update contains an overview of the developments that have characterised EU 
competition law and the digital economy in the February 2020-November 2021 time frame. 
Following the structure of the General Report, I will pay particular attention to Member States’ 
enforcement developments (I.), to changes in substantive competition law (II.), to developments 
in terms of remedies and to the relationship between competition law and (digital) regulation 
(III.). Although the principles and parameters governing debates on EU competition law and 
the digital economy have not changed, important developments have taken place in the 
abovementioned time frame 
I. Enforcement activities at EU level and in Member States: an ever-increasing focus 
on FAANG firms? 
In the General Report, we identified the emergence of more or less extensive enforcement 
activities and procedural/institutional upgrades among Member States. The following 
developments deserve to be highlighted in that respect. 
At EU level, the following additional enforcement and policy activities can be mentioned: 
- A Statement of Objections against Amazon: on 10 November 2020, the European 
Commission sent out a statement of objections against Amazon. The Commission is of 
the preliminary view that Amazon has breached EU antitrust rules by distorting 
competition in online retail markets. According to its press release, the Commission 
particularly takes issue with Amazon systematically relying on non-public business data 
of independent sellers who sell on its marketplace, to the benefit of Amazon's own retail 
business, which directly competes with those third-party sellers.2 
- A Statement of Objections against Apple: in June 2020, the European Commission had 
opened investigations against Apple in relation to the conditions under which its App-
store had to be used. In particular in the realm of music streaming services, Apple 
imposed on developers the mandatory use of Apple's own proprietary in-app purchase 
system as well as restrictions on the ability of developers to inform iPhone and iPad 
users of alternative cheaper purchasing possibilities outside of apps.3 On the basis of a 
preliminary investigation, the Commission sent out a Statement of Objections on 30 
April 2021, informing Apple of its preliminary view that it distorted competition in the 
music streaming market as it abused its dominant position for the distribution of music 
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streaming apps through its App Store.4 In a similar context, Epic Games also brought a 
complaint against Apple with the European Commission.5 
- Opening of an investigation against Facebook: on 4 June 2021, the Commission opened 
an investigation against Facebook. The aim of the investigation is to assess whether 
Facebook violated EU competition rules by using advertising data gathered in particular 
from advertisers in order to compete with them in markets where Facebook is active 
such as classified ads. According to the Commission, the formal investigation will also 
assess whether Facebook ties its online classified ads service “Facebook Marketplace” 
to its social network, in breach of EU competition rules.6 At the time of finalising this 
update, the investigation is still on-going. 
- In the realm of concentration control, the European Commission proposed further 
guidance on the issue of referrals of notified concentrations to the European 
Commission under Article 22 of Concentration Control Regulation 139/2004.7 
Although the digital economy has not been the only sector targeted by that guidance, 
the Commission made it clear that ‘market developments have resulted in a gradual 
increase of concentrations involving firms that play or may develop into playing a 
significant competitive role on the market(s) at stake despite generating little or no 
turnover at the moment of the concentration. These developments appear particularly 
significant in the digital economy, where services regularly launch with the aim of 
building up a significant user base and/or commercially valuable data inventories, 
before seeking to monetise the business’. It therefore invited Member States to refer 
(digital) cases to the Commission in case the concentration threatens to significantly 
affect competition. Those clarifications must make it possible for concentrations similar 
to the non-notified Facebook/Instagram merger to be evaluated by the European 
Commission.8 
Member States have for their parts also not shied away from taking enforcement actions against 
FAANG firms (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google). The following activities stand 
out in that context: 
- Changes to Austrian competition law: in September 2021, Austrian competition law has 
been modified as had been announced in the 2020 national report; modified merger 
thresholds and a modified dominance definition have been adopted in that context.9 
- Changes to the German Competition Act: in January 2021, the 10th Amendment to the 
German competition Act (GWB) was published.10 The Amendment introduces a section 
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19a into the GWB, allowing the Bundeskartellamt to prohibit certain types of behaviour 
of undertakings of paramount importance for competition across markets. It is no secret 
that digital economy players have been primarily targeted in that respect.11 On the basis 
of the new Act, the German Bundeskartellamt has initiated proceedings against Google, 
Apple and Amazon.12 
- A proposal to update the Greek Competition Act in order to tackle abuse of power in an 
ecosystem of structural importance for competition.13 
- The decisions taken and investigations opened by the French Autorité de la Concurrence 
against Google and Facebook.14 
- The investigation launched by the Dutch ACM against Apple, in which commitments 
have been solicited from the latter.15 
 
II. Substantive competition law 
Although the key provisions of (EU) competition law have remained intact, reflections have 
been on-going against the background of increased attention for the digital economy. 
In that context and as mentioned in the previous section, Austrian and German competition laws 
have been adapted to take this new reality into account. Those modifications especially 
highlight the important ‘gatekeeper’ function digital economy players may fulfil in order to 
justify intervention by competition authorities. Although formally extending and specifying 
competition law provisions, the German Act entrusts the Bundeskartellamt with more ex ante 
action powers. That development responds to concerns also addressed by EU regulatory 
developments that are nevertheless situated formally speaking outside the scope of EU 
competition law (including the Digital Markets Act, currently under negotiation and touched 
upon in section III.). 
In addition, on-going reflections on and updates of the European Commission’s market 
definition notice16 as well as the vertical agreements block exemption and vertical agreements 
guidance17 show that those updates can no longer deny the specifics of digital markets, as also 
highlighted in the update offered by the institutional rapporteur. 
The developments highlighted here demonstrate above all that the digital economy invites 
serious debates about whether or not to fine-tune generally applicable competition law 
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provisions, so as to avoid questions on their application to digital economy activities. It remains 
to be seen how that debate will translate into specific changes in substantive (soft law) rules. 
III. Remedies in competition law and its overlap with regulation in the digital economy 
In terms of remedies and regulatory overlap, the General Report concluded that relatively little 
innovation was to be found in this context, especially as Member States and the EU were 
considering whether or not to complement competition law frameworks with additional 
regulatory tools. In this update, that conclusion still holds. Although the use of competition law 
remedies has not been abandoned completely (i.), one could anticipate that attention to remedies 
will especially increase once a complementary regulatory instrument enters into force. 
Developments surrounding the the Digital Markets Act (DMA) go to the heart of those 
questions (ii.) 
i. Competition law remedies in the digital economy 
Digital economy cases have also given rise to the imposition of interim measures or remedies 
to alleviate competition law concerns. As already confirmed in the General Report, those 
remedies are relatively traditional and focus predominantly on behavioural obligations 
imposed. 
At EU level, the Google/Fitbit merger serves as a vivid illustration of this approach. The 
European Commission allowed the acquisition of Fitbit by Google to proceed, but only to the 
extent that Google committed itself to respect, for a 10-year period and supervised by a trustee, 
important behavioural measures.18 By way of example, Google committed not to use for Google 
Ads the health and wellness data collected from wrist-worn wearable devices and other Fitbit 
devices of users in the EEA, including search advertising, display advertising, and advertising 
intermediation products.19 
The French Autorité de la Concurrence also imposed behavioural interim measures on Google 
in a case involving Google’s refusal to display links to or parts of articles from news media that 
did not waive copyright claims against Google. In 2020, the French Autorité took interim 
measures that required Google to enter into individual negotiations with relevant copyright 
holders20, a decision which was upheld by the Paris Court of Appeal.21 As Google failed to 
comply in this respect, the Autorité imposed a fine of €500 million as a consequence.22 The 
saga shows that the Autorité considers interim measures to offer a valuable tool to avoid 
competition by digital players to be distorted. It remains to be seen, however, whether the use 
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of fines to nudge firms into compliance is a sufficient tool to ensure that competition is restored. 
The observations made in the 2020 General Report still hold in that regard. 
ii. Towards a complementary remedial and regulatory framework? 
When we finalised our General Report in April 2020, reflections were still-ongoing with regard 
to the adoption of a so-called ‘new competition tool’ that would complement existing 
competition law provisions at EU level. Inspired by similar reflections and initiatives in the 
United Kingdom23, the Commission proposed a Digital Markets Act (DMA) regulation on 15 
December 2020. If and when adopted, the DMA proposes to have in place specific rules and 
oversight mechanisms that would allow to ensure that digital markets remain contestable and 
fair whenever so-called gatekeepers are present.24 
The DMA applies to those undertakings considered to be digital gatekeepers. The European 
Commission, following a market investigation, will take a decision on gatekeeper status. To 
qualify as such, the proposal outlines substantive and quantitative criteria. First, the undertaking 
concerned would need to provide one or more so-called core online platform services to 
business users established in the Union or end users established or located in the Union,.25 The 
DMA proposal more particularly distinguishes the following categories: (i) online 
intermediation services (including for example marketplaces, app stores and online 
intermediation services in other sectors like mobility, transport or energy) (ii) online search 
engines, (iii) social networking (iv) video sharing platform services, (v) number-independent 
interpersonal electronic communication services, (vi) operating systems, (vii) cloud services 
and (viii) advertising services, including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any 
other advertising intermediation services, where these advertising services are being related to 
one or more of the other core platform services.26 Second, in order to be qualified as 
gatekeepers, core online platform services providers need to (i) have a significant impact on the 
internal market, (ii) operate one or more important gateways to customers and (iii) enjoy or be 
expected to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in their operations.27 Those criteria would 
be met when a number of quantitative thresholds are present. a service provider has (i) a 
significant impact when the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual EEA turnover 
equal to or above EUR 6.5 billion in the last three financial years, or where the average market 
capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs 
amounted to at least EUR 65 billion in the last financial year, and it provides a core platform 
service in at least three Member States. It operates (ii) an important gateway whenever it 
provides a core platform service that has on average throughout the last year more than 45 
million monthly active end users established or located in the Union and more than 10 000 
yearly active business users established in the Union in the last financial year. It enjoys (iii) an 
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entrenched position whenever the previous two criteria have been fulfilled over the past three 
financial years.28 Whenever not all quantitative criteria have been met, the Commission may 
still designate a core online platform services provider as a gatekeeper when it concludes, on 
the basis of a qualitative assessment, that the three substantive criteria have been met 
nonetheless. Inversely, a provider meeting all quantitative criteria would be able demonstrate 
that it does not act as a gatekeeper.29  
The proposal also outlines in considerable detail the behaviour that cannot be engaged in by 
gatekeepers. That behaviour includes […]. Those obligations are directly inspired by types of 
behaviour of which businesses such as Google, Facebook and Amazon have been accused and 
for which EU competition law provisions had been mobilised.30 The European Commission 
could, by means of a delegated Regulation, modify or update those obligations and 
requirements.31 
In case of systematic non-compliance with DMA regulatory obligations, the Commission could 
initiate a new market investigation. In that context, the Commission, by means of a decision 
adopted at the latest twelve months after opening the market investigation, impose on such 
gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to ensure compliance with the DMA Regulation.32 This provision 
allows to speculate that the Commission could break up big digital players and force them to 
have their different services provision activities separated. Such decision would amount to a 
structural remedy, whereby the Commission orders market structures to be changed. Although 
it is theoretically possible that this could be done, the DMA proposal states that the Commission 
‘may only impose structural remedies (…) either where there is no equally effective behavioural 
remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the 
gatekeeper concerned than the structural remedy’.33 It remains to be seen how that obligation 
would take shape in practice. 
At the time of finalising this update, legislative discussions on the DMA are still on-going. It 
remains to be seen what kind of agreement will be found between the Member States in the 
Council on that matter, especially with regard to the roles of national competition authorities in 
DMA enforcement.34 It cannot be denied, however, that the DMA will raise important questions 
on the intersection between competition law and regulation. It will most likely fall upon the 
Court of Justice to clarify those questions in the not so distant future.  
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